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Abstract 
The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the unrest, revolution and war that followed during the course of 2011 have 
forced the EU to acknowledge the need to radically re-think its policy approach towards the Southern 
Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now feature as key components of 
High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new framework for cooperation with the region (Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity), while the EU has declared its intention to strengthen its external migration 
policy by setting up “mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries – so-called ‘Dialogues for Migration, 
Mobility and Security’ –  now placed at the centre of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (GAMM). However, the success of this approach and its potential to establish genuine cooperative 
partnerships that will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa hinge on the 
working arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level which has long 
been marked by internal fragmentation, a lack of transparency and a predominance of home affairs and security 
actors. 
This paper investigates the development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern 
Mediterranean in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. It asks to what extent has the application of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the creation of an “EU Foreign Minister” in High Representative Ashton, supported by a 
European External Action Service (EEAS), remedied or re-invigorated the ideological and institutional struggles 
around the implementation of the Global Approach? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the 
Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security? Who goes abroad to speak on the behalf of the EU in these 
Dialogues and what impact does this have on the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Dialogues 
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EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring 
What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations? 
Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog and Joanna Parkin* 
MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15/August 2012 
Introduction 
The shockwaves of what has become known as the ‘Arab Spring’ have unsettled the complex web of 
institutional arrangements and policy strategies governing the EU’s management of migratory flows 
from the Southern Mediterranean. As the events of 2011 unfolded from civil unrest to uprisings, 
revolution and war, the EU’s progressive externalization of its migration policy agenda has come 
under the spotlight.  
The Arab Spring forced EU leaders to acknowledge the need to re-think its policy approach towards 
the Southern Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now 
feature as key components of High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new Partnership for Democracy 
and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, launched in March 2011.1 Subsequently, the 
European Commission called for the EU to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up 
partnerships with non-EU countries that make cooperation on migration “mutually beneficial” – so-
called ‘Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security’.2 This approach was reinforced by the 
adoption of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in November 
2011,3 which aims to initiate a more strategic phase of the Global Approach with a stronger emphasis 
on legal migration, development promotion and migrant rights. The GAMM is to be translated into 
action via Migration and Mobility Dialogues in which policy tools known as Mobility Partnerships are 
foreseen as the principal instruments for future cooperation. Mobility Partnerships are to be conceived 
as “a long term framework based on political dialogue and operational cooperation…within the 
general context of the relations between the EU and the partner country concerned”.4 Consequently, 
autumn 2011 saw Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security launched with Tunisia and Morocco, 
                                                     
* Sergio Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs Section of the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. Joanna Parkin is Researcher in the same section. Leonhard den 
Hertog is Marie Curie PhD Fellow, of the Universities of Cologne & Edinburgh (EXACT Project on EU 
External Relations). An earlier version of this paper was presented at three international events (ASAN Plenum 
in Seoul, 26 April 2012, a Conference organised by the Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER), 
the T.M.C. Asser Instituut, and the Universidad de Pablo de Olavide, in Seville on 10-11 May 2012 and the 
International Meeting of Researchers in Immigration and Asylum Law, University of Valencia, 14 June 2012). 
The authors would like to thank the seminar participants and discussants for their input into this paper. The 
authors are also grateful to Rym Ayadi for her support of this research and Elspeth Guild for her comments on 
the preliminary version. We would also like to express our gratitude to the officials in the European 
Commission, Council, EEAS and Presidency of the EU who were interviewed for the purposes of this paper.  
1 European Commission, High Representative, Joint Communication, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Brussels, 8 March 2011, COM(2011) 200 final. 
2 European Commission, Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the Southern 
Mediterranean countries, COM(2011) 292 final. 
3 European Commission, Communication, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM(2011) 743 
final, Brussels, 18.11.2011. 
4 See European Commission Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the Southern 
Mediterranean countries, op. cit., p. 11. 
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with similar dialogues foreseen with other countries in the Southern Mediterranean region, namely 
Egypt, Jordan and eventually Libya.  
The success of this new approach, and its potential to establish genuine cooperative partnerships that 
will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa, hinges on the working 
arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level. The last 
decade of European integration has seen the emergence of the ‘external dimension’ as a new and 
distinct policy domain of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and now the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ), one in which member state Interior Ministries and EU Home Affairs 
officials have played a dominant role. As member states have been hesitant to develop common EU 
frameworks on immigration legislation and policies internally, the external dimension has been seized 
upon by EU home affairs actors as an opportunity to develop and push forward certain EU home 
affairs agendas, thus circumventing the deadlocks that have blocked the construction of the AFSJ.  
The Commission’s DG Home Affairs (formerly part of the DG Justice, Freedom and Security) has 
used ‘going abroad’ as a strategy to increasingly acquire authority and expand its responsibilities, 
supported by the decision-making structures of the Council. Moreover, the predominance of Home 
Affairs officials effectively playing the part of diplomats within the external dimension has had a 
profound effect on the policy priorities and actions implemented under the Global Approach, enabling 
the logics of security, policing and mobility as ‘migration control’ (in particular readmission 
agreements and border controls) to prevail over collaboration on legal channels for human mobility, 
such as labour immigration, and the promotion of migrants’ rights.  
Has the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon changed this picture? Today the migration debates in 
the wake of the Arab Spring occur in the context of a new EU landscape provided by the Lisbon 
Treaty, whose legal innovations and institutional modifications have reshaped the architectures and 
actors underpinning the EU’s external actions and practices. The abolition of the old JHA pillar 
structure (First/Third Pillar divide), the expansion of the EU’s competences and decision-making 
processes on legal immigration policy and streamlining of decision-making procedures via the creation 
of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs promised to smooth the challenges of 
fragmentation and (in)coherence between the EU’s foreign policy instruments and internal policy 
domains with significant external dimensions, e.g. migration policy. The High Representative, 
supported by the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS) would have an extensive 
mandate to centralize the conduct of the Union’s foreign and security policy, coordinate the 
Commission’s external relations portfolios and mediate between the EU institutions and third 
countries. This new framework held the potential to create the legal and institutional conditions that 
could support a GAMM more in sync with the wider European Neighbourhood Policy and 
complementary to the broader objectives of the EU’s foreign policy and development cooperation. 
More than a year since the outbreak of unrest in the Southern Mediterranean, this paper aims to apply 
the EU’s migration policy response in the wake of the Arab Spring as a test case, investigating the 
development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean 
in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. What have been the main EU policy responses to human 
mobility flows from North Africa? How do we need to understand them in light of the new inter-
institutional setting emerging from the Lisbon Treaty? This paper asks in particular to what extent has 
the creation of an ‘EU Foreign Minister’ in High Representative Ashton, supported by a European 
External Action Service, remedied or re-invigorated the pre-Lisbon Treaty EU institutional struggles 
around the implementation of the Global Approach between  ‘home affairs’ and ‘foreign affairs’ 
actors? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and 
Security, ‘who’ goes abroad to speak on the EU’s behalf in these Dialogues and what impact does this 
have on the kind of EU policy responses and the scope of the Dialogues under the renewed GAMM?  
We examine the first set of Dialogues established under the renewed Global Approach: the bilateral 
partnerships being established under the Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security with the 
Southern Mediterranean Countries, as presented in the Commission’s Communication of 24 May 2011 
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(hereinafter the Dialogue Communication).5 The paper assesses the potential for the dialogues and 
their core tool of implementation, the Mobility Partnerships, to put into practice the EU’s commitment 
to a stronger engagement and partnership in the region that “would foster people-to-people contacts 
and further promote mutual understanding as well as business and employment”.6  
Our assessment is carried out in three main steps. We start by examining the main policy initiatives 
that were taken by the EU in response to the migratory phenomena ensuing from the events in North 
Africa during 2011. It highlights the nature of the substantive policies and actions implemented in 
particular by the European Commission and EU agencies, noting the reliance on security-centred 
migration management measures.  
Section 2 then moves into critically analysing the Dialogues for Migration Mobility and Security, 
focusing in particular on the Mobility Partnership instrument.  
Section 3 of the paper takes the third step by examining the political and institutional actors behind the 
development and implementation of the Dialogues, which, as we will argue, are central when 
understanding the deficits and incoherencies affecting the EU policy responses.  
Based on this analysis the paper argues that a Home Affairs approach continues to dominate the EU’s 
external dimension on migration, and may even have been reinforced following the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The paper exposes a fragmented and competitive field of action within the Global 
Approach characterised by a multitude of turf sensitivities between the Commission and the EEAS and 
still dominated by an overriding framing of mobility as insecurity, emergency-driven policy responses 
and conditionality-based partnerships with third countries.  
On the basis of this evaluation, the paper concludes by presenting two scenarios for taking forward the 
dialogue with southern Mediterranean countries: the first based on a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario of a 
conditional partnership led principally by DG Home Affairs; the second, based on reoriented Mobility 
Partnerships with a coordinating role assigned to the European External Action Service. 
1. Assessing the EU’s migration policy responses to the Arab 
Spring 
The uprisings of the Arab Spring produced a highly insecure situation for individuals in the North 
African region and prompted significant cross-border movements in the spring and summer of 2011 as 
people fled violent street clashes, arrests, political turbulence and, in the case of Libya, heavy military 
ground fighting. Migration flows were largely confined to intra-regional movement between the 
countries of North Africa with by far the heaviest flows occurring from those fleeing fighting in Libya. 
More than 1 million individuals left Libyan territory in the spring and summer of 2011, of which 
around 400,000 were Libyans seeking safety abroad and approximately 700,000 were foreign 
nationals. A substantial proportion of the outflow from Libya was received by Tunisia and Egypt (both 
recuperating from their own revolutions), who between them admitted approximately half a million 
migrants (alongside half a million of their own returning nationals).7 According to the UNHCR, this 
group included a significant minority of individuals in need of or seeking international protection. For 
arrivals in Tunisia alone, the UNHCR registered around 1,500 refugees and 2,000 asylum-seekers 
between January and August 2011.8 At the start of 2012, the population residing in the UNHCR-run 
                                                     
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 7. 
7 International Office of Migration (IOM), “Response to the Libyan Crisis”, External Situation Report, 31 
October 2011 (http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/external_sit_rep_31st_october.pdf); 
UNHCR, 2012 country operations profile – Libya; UNHCR, 2012 country operations profile – Tunisia; 
UNHCR, 2012 country operations profile – Egypt (http://www.unhcr.org). 
8 UNHCR, Southern Tunisia Weekly Update, 1 August 2011, Issue 2. 
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transit camp in southern Tunisia still comprised around 1,470 asylum-seekers and more than 2,230 
refugees from 31 countries, mostly Eritreans, Somalis, and Sudanese.9  
By contrast, the number of individuals that fled the upheavals in North Africa by crossing the 
Mediterranean to Europe was relatively minor. The EU, primarily Italy and Malta, saw a rising inflow 
of migrants during the first half of 2011, but overall figures were a fraction of the population 
displacement witnessed in the Southern Mediterranean. Between 1 January and 31 July 2011, Italy 
received approximately 48,000 irregular migrants as part of the 2011 influx from North Africa of 
whom 24,769 originated from Tunisia and 23,267 arrived from Libya (made up largely of migrants 
originating from sub-Saharan Africa).10 Malta received just over 1,500 individuals during the spring 
and summer of 2011, the vast majority from Libya and again comprising individuals from sub-Saharan 
Africa.11 
How did the Union respond to both these immediate migration pressures and the deeper challenges 
revealed by the Arab spring? 
1.1 Emergency responses to migration flows from the Southern 
Mediterranean in 2011 
The EU’s immediate response to increased flows of migrants fleeing the unrest, revolution and war in 
North Africa in the first half of 2011 centred largely on control and containment of migrants 
(including asylum-seekers and refugees) in the Southern Mediterranean. In addition to deploying 
considerable sums of humanitarian aid and supporting repatriations of foreign nationals stranded in 
Libya,12 EU actions in response to human movements was broadly divided into four types of 
measures: i) the intensification of border control and surveillance, ii) pressure on new authorities in 
North Africa to cooperate in curbing irregular migration, iii) the introduction of new legislative 
proposals suspending  mobility and iv) the attempt to address the refugee crisis in North Africa. 
1.1.1 Border Control and Surveillance: Frontex and Europol 
The most immediate EU response was to intensify border control and surveillance policies through the 
mobilisation of the EU border agency, Frontex. On 20 February 2011, four days after receiving a 
request from Italy, Frontex deployed the Joint Operation EPN Hermes extension 2011 aimed at 
“assisting Italy in controlling vessels carrying immigrants and refugees”.13 The operation was led by 
Italy which provided naval and aerial equipment (supported by France, Germany, Malta, the 
Netherlands and Spain) and brought together experts from 11 member states. Actions focused 
primarily on “detecting and preventing illegitimate border crossings to the Pelagic Islands, Sicily and 
the Italian mainland”,14 but also encompassed the pre-screening of intercepted migrants by Frontex 
                                                     
9 UNHCR, 2012 UNHCR country operations profile – Tunisia (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486166.html)  
10 Figures provided by the Italian Ministry of Interior at a press conference held in mid-August 2011 and cited in 
Nascimbene & Di Pascale (2011, p. 343). See also International Office of Migration, “Response to the Libyan 
Crisis”, op. cit.  
11 IOM, ibid. 
12 Humanitarian aid allocated to the crisis by the EU was first earmarked at €3 million in February 2011, rising to 
€70 million out of a total EU (European Commission and member states) humanitarian aid and civil protection 
financing of €160 million. Aid was used to support the financing of relief assistance in Libya and transit camps 
in Tunisia and Egypt as well as the evacuation and repatriation of third country nationals, carried out with the 
support of IOM. See Commission Press release, “The European Commission’s humanitarian response to the 
crisis in Libya” MEMO/11/143, Brussels, 4 March 2011; Commission factsheet, “Humanitarian aid and civil 
protection: Libya crisis”, 25 October 2011 (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/2011/20110823_02_en.htm). 
13 EU Commissioner Malmström, Statement announcing the launch of the Frontex operation ‘HERMES’ in Italy 
as of 20 February 2011, MEMO/11/98, Brussels, 20 February 2011. 
14 Frontex Press Release, “HERMES 2011 running”, 21 February 2011, p. 2. 
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officials and gathering information on routes and arrival numbers for the development of risk analyses. 
A delegation of agents from the European Police Office (Europol), an agency whose primary role is to 
coordinate action on serious international crime and terrorism, was also deployed in Southern Italy in 
order to “help [Italy’s] law enforcement authorities to identify possible criminals among the irregular 
migrants having reached the Italian territory”.15 Agents were purportedly searching for human 
smugglers and traffickers among the new arrivals although the precise objectives and activities of this 
delegation remained somewhat opaque.16 
In April the Commission announced its intention to launch procedures for reinforcing the Frontex 
2011 budget with an additional €30 million.17 The Hermes operation was subsequently extended on 
several occasions,18 and is now expected to run until the end of 2012. Furthermore, the JHA Council 
of 11-12 April also called on Frontex to speed up negotiations to conclude working arrangements with 
countries in the region, particularly Tunisia, with a view to organising joint patrol operations.19 
However, it failed to secure the agreement of the transitional authorities in Tunis to undertake 
surveillance in Tunisian waters. Despite the Hermes Joint Operation reportedly fulfilling a ‘search and 
rescue’ function, the EU came in for criticism for not doing enough to prevent deaths at sea and for 
primarily focusing attention on the prevention of irregular entries.20 According to UNHCR figures, 
more than 1,500 people drowned or went missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach 
Europe, making 2011 the deadliest year on record.21 Reports of military vessels failing to assist a boat 
drifting in the Mediterranean upon which 63 sub-Saharan Africans subsequently died point to the lack 
of a coordinated response to the boat migration from the Southern Mediterranean.22 A subsequent 
report by the Council of Europe based on a nine-month investigation into the incident revealed a 
catalogue of both human and institutional errors and a “vacuum of responsibility” regarding search 
and rescue in the Mediterranean sea. 23   
1.1.2 Strengthening ‘capacity building’ in “the fight against irregular immigration” 
The EU began at a relatively early stage to exert pressure on the burgeoning democracies in North 
Africa to cooperate in clamping down on irregular migration. As the dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya fell, so too did the bilateral agreements that ensured regimes in North Africa act as 
gatekeepers, policing the flow of migrants to Europe. Individual EU member states quickly began 
positioning themselves to set up new bilateral arrangements with post-revolution transitional 
authorities.   
Italy for instance moved fast to conclude an accelerated repatriation agreement with the authorities in 
Tunis, signed on 5 April 2011, by which it offered €200 million in aid and credit in return for 
                                                     
15 European Commission, Communication on Migration, COM(2011) 248 final, Brussels, 4 May 2011. 
16 Guild et al. (2011). 
17 Commission Press release, “The European Commission’s response to the migratory flows from North Africa”, 
MEMO/11/226, Brussels, 8 April 2011. 
18 Answer by Commissioner Malmstrom to Parliamentary Question of 21 September 2011 [E-006719/2011]. 
19 Council Conclusions on the management of migration from the Southern Neighbourhood, JHA Council 
meeting, Luxembourg, 11-12 April 2011. 
20  Human Rights Watch, “EU: Put Rights at Heart of Migration Policy”, 20 June 2011. 
21 UNHCR, “Mediterranean takes record as most deadly stretch of water for refugees and migrants in 2011”, 
Briefing Note, 31 January 2012. 
22 Jack Shenker, “Aircraft carrier left us to die, say migrants”, The Guardian, 8 May 2011 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/nato-ship-libyan-migrants). 
23 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe report “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is 
responsible?”, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Rapporteur Ms Tineke Strik. 
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Tunisia’s cooperation in preventing further departures and accepting returned migrants,24 a move that 
led almost immediately to a 75% drop in the flow of Tunisian migrants.25 Italy also reached an 
agreement with the National Transitional Council of Libya on 17 June 2011, for cooperation in the 
fight against illegal immigration, including the return of irregular migrants.26 As a result of these 
agreements, over 13,000 migrants were returned between January – July 2011.27 It was not clear 
whether these repatriations took full account of the risks of returning individuals to post-revolutionary 
and post-conflict zones (including potential reprisal attacks). Their compliance with international law 
and the principle of non-refoulement is highly questionable, particularly the Italy-Libya accord, which 
was severely criticised by NGOs for its apparent disregard for international legal standards.28 
Yet despite these critiques, the EU lost little time in following Italy’s example to secure cooperation 
on limiting migration in return for aid, particularly with Tunisia. In a visit to Tunis by Commission 
President Barroso in April 2011, it was made clear that the EU’s offer of around €400 million of aid to 
support Tunisia’s democratic transition would necessitate reciprocal actions to counter irregular 
migration.29 Reports have suggested that the new Tunisian authorities were initially reluctant to 
engage with the EU on this matter, determined that post-revolutionary Tunisia would dissociate itself 
from the stance of former President Ben Ali when confronted with European pressure on migration, 
and resolving that to treat migration only as a security issue to the benefit of EU states would run 
counter to the goals of economic, social and democratic transition.30  Nonetheless, EU pressure and the 
offer of substantial financial incentives appeared to have won out when Home Affairs Commissioner 
Malmström proposed to the European Council of June 2011 a ‘joint EU-Tunisia operational project’. 
The project would support the new Tunisian authorities to undertake a number of capacity-building 
measures in the field of border control, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, asylum, return and 
reintegration of returnees, and to support access to legal migration channels.31  
1.1.3 Suspending Freedom of Movement 
The third key EU action in the face of immigration from the Arab spring was to insert clauses in 
current pieces of EU legislation imposing restrictions on mobility justified by factors of “external 
migratory pressure”. In its Communication on Migration of May 2011, the Commission signalled its 
intention submit two separate proposals designed to insert “emergency mechanisms” in existing 
legislation to allow the EU “to better respond to future influxes of migrants”.32 Although the first of 
these proposals – a modification to the Visa Regulation – had been in the pipeline for some time, the 
                                                     
24 ANSA English, “Italy continues talks with Tunis, no halt to migrant flood – over 900 arrive in Lampedusa late 
Monday, early Tuesday”, 5 April 2011; Reuters (Africa), “Italy, Tunisia sign deal to ease migrant crisis”, 5 April 
2011. 
25 Frontex (2012), FRAN Quarterly, Issue 3, July – September 2011. 
26  This agreement has since been complemented by a verbal agreement between the Ministers of Interiors of 
Italy and Libya signed on 3 April 2012, which sets out a number of additional areas of cooperation including 
border surveillance and voluntary return and repatriation. See Minutes of the meeting of the Ministers of the 
Interior of Italy and Libya (Tripoli, 3 April 2012). 
27 As stated by the Italian Minister of the Interior and quoted in Nascimbene & Di Pascale (2011, p. 358). 
28  For instance, see Statewatch (2011), “ASGI questions the lawfulness of Italy’s agreement with the NTC” 
(http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/jun/04italy-libya-asgi.htm).  
29 T. Vogel, “Barroso Pledges Extra Aid for Tunisia”, European Voice, 13 April 2011. 
30 Based on reports by French and Moroccan NGOs ‘CIMADE’ and ‘GADEM’ and La Presse de Tunisie, quoted  
in Y. Maccanico (2011), “The EU’s self-interested  response to unrest in North Africa: the meaning of treaties 
and readmission agreements between Italy and North African states”, Statewatch Analysis. 
31 COM(2011) 292 final, op. cit., p. 5. See also Commissioner Malmstrom’s response to a written question of the 
European Parliament on “EU-Tunisia joint operational project”, 18 October 2011. The proposed project was 
later incorporated into the Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security. 
32 European Commission, Communication on Migration, op. cit. 
EU MIGRATION POLICY IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING | 7 
 
second proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) was directly influenced by the events of 
the Arab spring.33  
In the spring of 2011, a diplomatic dispute between France and Italy was responsible for sparking 
renewed debates around the reform of the SBC. The Italian government, faced with the arrival of 
approximately 30,000 Tunisian migrants in the first quarter of 2011, granted temporary protection 
permitting travel throughout the Schengen area, a move which in turn prompted France to introduce 
spot checks at its Italian frontier.34 This sequence of events revived discussions at the political level of 
the EU over the justifications and procedures for the reintroduction of internal border controls, with a 
joint letter from former Presidents Sarkozy and Berlusconi calling for the European Council to include 
“the possibility to temporarily re-establish internal border controls in case of exceptional difficulties 
in the management of common external borders”.35  
It was widely questioned at the time, including in a public statement by Home Affairs Commissioner 
Cecilia Malmström,36 whether the volume of Tunisian migrants arriving in Italy and crossing the 
French border, could indeed constitute a genuine threat to public policy and internal security 
(particularly when placed against the enormous displacement of people in North Africa following the 
events of the Arab Spring. However this did not prevent the European Commission from addressing 
the Franco-Italian request in its proposal for an amendment to the Schengen rules adopted in 
September 2011.37 The so-called Schengen Governance Package thus now explicitly states that “the 
crossing of the external border of a large number of third country nationals might, in exceptional 
circumstances, justify the immediate reintroduction of some internal border controls”,38 although it 
emphasises that evidence of a serious risk to public policy and internal security is necessary to justify 
applying such an exception. Furthermore, the proposal states that reintroduction of internal controls 
would be justified by a member state’s persistent failure to protect a part of the EU’s external border 
(again insofar as this poses a threat to public policy and internal security).39   
The origins of the SBC reform provides the clearest illustration of the ‘emergency-driven’ decision-
making process that characterised the EU’s immediate response to the migration flows from the 
Southern Mediterranean in the first half of 2011. The response revealed the limits to the EU’s claims 
of solidarity with the peoples and new regimes in North Africa, with generous humanitarian assistance 
directed to migrants and refugees within the Southern Mediterranean region, while ensuring that 
movement of migrants towards EU territory was restricted.40  
 
                                                     
33 Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on 
the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances, COM(2011) 560 
final, Brussels, 16.9.2011. 
34 Carrera et al. (2011). 
35 See the website of the Italian ministry of foreign affairs (http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Sala_Stampa/ 
ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2011/04/20110426_ItaliaFrancia.htm). 
36 Statement by Commissioner Malmström following her visit to Tunisia, in the European Commission Midday 
Press Briefing of 1 April 2011 (http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?sitelang=en&ref=76390). 
37 For a discussion on the necessity and proportionality of the Schengen Governance Package, see Carrera 
(2012). 
38 Preamble of the Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for 
common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances, 
COM(2011) 560 final, 16.09.2011, Brussels. 
39 Article 26 of the Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for 
common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances, 
COM(2011) 560 final, 16.09.2011, Brussels. 
40 Martin (2011). 
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1.1.4 Failure to alleviate the refugee crisis in North Africa 
Efforts to alleviate the refugee crisis in North Africa showed a similar pattern. In December 2011, the 
Commission launched a Regional Protection Programme (RPP) in North Africa designed to support 
capacity-building in refugee assistance in the region (particularly Tunisia, Egypt and eventually 
Libya). RPPs, which are supported by the EU and depend on a partnership with the UNHCR for their 
implementation, provide the EU with a means to manage refugee crises beyond European borders.41 
The partnership approach underpinning RPPs presumes the resettlement of refugees on EU soil 
alongside capacity-building in countries of origin and transit. However, efforts by the European 
Commission to encourage the resettlement of refugees stranded in North Africa in 2011 bore little 
fruit.  
The results of a Commission-organised ‘pledging conference’ of 12 May 2011, which aimed to 
encourage member states to voluntarily resettle refugees in North Africa and beneficiaries of 
international protection in Malta, were underwhelming. EU member states and a number of associate 
states volunteered to relocate within their territory approximately 300 persons granted international 
protection in Malta,42 while eight member states pledged approximately 700 places for refugees 
emerging from the conflict in Libya and neighbouring countries. The latter figure fell some way short 
of the 7,000 refugees that the UNHCR has estimated will need resettlement from Libya, Tunisia and 
Egypt and provoked criticism from human rights and refugee organisations.43 Consequently, 
Commissioner Malmström conceded that Europe had “failed” refugees fleeing the crisis in the 
Southern Mediterranean in 2011.44 
1.2 The EU’s ‘medium- to long-term’ response – paving the way to 
Dialogue 
How do we locate the development of the Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security with the 
Southern Mediterranean in relation to these four responses? The European Commission itself 
acknowledged the emergency-driven nature of its immediate responses to the migration from the Arab 
Spring, justifying these actions in its Communication on Migration of May 2011 as necessary to cope 
with the unfolding crisis. Yet, the Commission was careful to discursively frame these measures as 
“short term” emergency actions, and distinguished them from a “longer term”, more “comprehensive” 
response to the migration impacts of the Arab Spring stated to be under elaboration:  
The need to address this challenging and evolving situation should not lead to a short-term 
approach limited to border control without taking account of long-term issues. Dialogue and 
cooperation with countries of origin and of transit of these migrants is essential. Such 
collaboration needs to be built on security and good governance for the establishment of 
mutually beneficial policies in the field of legal migration.45 
The framing of a “comprehensive”, “longer term” response to migration found its roots in the renewed 
vision of the EU’s partnership with the region presented in a joint communication by the Commission 
and EU High Representative Ms Ashton of 8 March 2011. Entitled “A Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, the overarching approach was to create an 
incentive-based regime (‘more for more’) in which North African countries would be expected to 
                                                     
41 Ibid. 
42 European Commission, Statement by Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner in charge of Home Affairs, on 
the results of the Ministerial Pledging Conference 12 May, 13 May 2011.   
43  Amnesty International for instance labelled the outcome of the pledging conference “an abysmal response”. 
See Amnesty International, “Europe, Now is Your Turn to Act: Refugees Forced out of Libya Urgently Need 
Resettlement”, September 2011.  
44 C. Malmstrom, “Refugees: How Europe Failed”, The Times of Malta, 19 January 2012. 
45 European Commission, Communication on Migration, op. cit. 
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make advancements towards democracy, civil society involvement and human rights, with free and 
fair elections being the prerequisite for the partnership to be entered into.46 A substantial proportion of 
the Communication is devoted to economic, financial and trade aspects of EU-North Africa 
cooperation.47 However, “mobility” was also identified as a key priority, and Mobility Partnerships 
proposed as a means to provide for a “well managed” movement of persons between the southern 
Mediterranean and the EU and to facilitate “people to people contacts”. The communication also 
suggests legal migration legislation and changes to visa policy to enhance mobility in the short term, 
envisaging “gradual steps towards visa liberalisation for individual partner countries’ over the longer 
term”.48  
The European Council endorsed the Partnership at its meeting of 24 March 2011, and called on the 
Commission to present a plan for the development of capacities to manage migration and refugee 
flows in the Mediterranean in advance of the June European Council.49 Unlike the Partnership 
Communication, which was spearheaded by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the 
External Action Service, responsibility for developing the migration aspects, what was later to become 
the Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security, was passed to DG Home Affairs. This, as we will 
argue in section 3 below, constituted a decisive factor in terms of the scope and nature of the EU 
policy responses.  
Work on the dialogue was taken forward by DG Home Affairs in the spring of 2011, against the 
background of the Franco-Italian dispute over the influx of Tunisian migrants and wider political 
concerns regarding the supposed ‘flood’ of migrants arriving from the Southern Mediterranean. In the 
midst of the Franco-Italian affair, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers met on 11-12 April and 
concluded that: 
The Dialogue should in first instance focus on the identification and promotion of measures 
which can contribute in a concrete and effective way to the prevention of illegal migration, to 
the effective management and control of their external borders, to the facilitation of the return 
and readmission of irregular migrants, and to the development of protection in the region for 
those in need, including through regional protection programmes. Subsequently, this dialogue 
could explore the possibilities for facilitating people-to-people contacts using instruments 
such as mobility partnerships. 
The Council conclusions thus firmly established the order of priorities underpinning the Dialogue. The 
emphasis clearly shifts from a dynamic mobility policy aimed at supporting burgeoning 
democratisation in North Africa, to migration management and border controls.  
As media debates around the migrant ‘crisis’ from North Africa intensified, the Commission adopted 
an interim Communication on Migration on May 4th in which it set out an array of current and future 
policy proposals in the domain of border, migration and asylum policy.50 The text largely re-states 
existing proposals (from border surveillance systems like EUROSUR to the employers sanctions 
Directive), but in some cases demands legislative and institutional changes (such as the revision to the 
Schengen Borders Code). The Communication also prepared the ground for a package of proposals 
due on May 24th which will “ensure a coherent EU approach in the area of migration, mobility and 
security with the Southern Mediterranean countries”. In a section towards the end of the document 
entitled “Beyond the Crisis: The EU and the Southern Mediterranean in Partnership”, the 
                                                     
46 Commission, High Representative, Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A Partnership 
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Brussels, 8 March 2011, COM(2011) 
200 final, p. 5. 
47 Ibid., pp. 7-13. 
48 Ibid., pp. 6-7.  
49 Conclusions March European Council, 2011. 
50 European Commission, Communication on Migration, op. cit. 
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communication draws links with the March 8th communication and the revised European 
Neighbourhood Policy to acknowledge a broader view of migration policy: 
People-to-people contacts across the Mediterranean should support burgeoning 
democratisation in North Africa. Enhanced mobility will increase understanding and boost 
trade relations. The EU needs to offer its partners in the neighbourhood a dynamic mobility 
policy, including visas, which is also solidly anchored within the EU external policy. 
The resulting Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean was 
finally adopted by the Commission on 24 May 2011 and endorsed by the subsequent June European 
Council.51 The Dialogue Communication again distinguishes ‘urgent’ and ‘short term’ actions needed 
to address the immediate flows of migrants and refugees from North Africa from its ‘plan of measures 
for the longer term’ based on enhanced cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean countries and 
aiming to ensure that “migration and mobility between the EU and the South Mediterranean countries 
are channelled through regular processes and take place in an orderly and efficient manner.”52 The 
Dialogue communication positions the Mobility Partnership as the main tool through which to achieve 
this objective. This approach was later re-affirmed when the Commission adopted its renewed Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) which likewise foresees Mobility Partnerships, within 
the framework of ‘Dialogues for Migration and Mobility’ to be: 
Upgraded and promoted as the principal framework for cooperation in the area of migration 
and mobility between the EU and its partners, with a primary focus on the countries in the EU 
neighbourhood.53 
The GAMM was reframed around new Migration and Mobility Dialogues based on a two-speed 
system that will see certain third countries singled out for Mobility Partnerships, while those 
international partners deemed unready (or unwilling) to enter this framework of cooperation will be 
offered a Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility (CAMM). The latter entails ‘softer’ forms of 
cooperation in the shape of common recommendations, targets, information exchange and capacity-
building measures.   
One of the core goals of the renewed GAMM is to ensure that the Global Approach to Migration is 
more closely embedded in the wide spectrum of the EU’s external policies. The European 
Commission underscores the necessity for the GAMM to be “complementary to other, broader 
objectives that are served by EU foreign policy and development cooperation” and to “address 
migration and mobility, foreign policy and development objectives in a coherent and integrated 
way.”54 The extent to which the GAMM delivers on this promise is tested via the first major policy 
initiative falling within this framework – the Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security with the 
Southern Mediterranean. 
2. Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern 
Mediterranean – Whose Dialogue?  
When analysing the Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security, it is necessary to ascertain whose 
dialogue is at stake in the Dialogue Communication: who are the principal interlocutors and do these 
first steps lay the ground for a genuine dialogue or rather pave the way to a home affairs-driven 
monologue?  
                                                     
51 European Council, Conclusions of Meeting 23-24 June 2011, Brussels, 24 June 2011, p. 28. 
52 European Commission, Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern 
Mediterranean countries, op. cit., p. 7.  
53 European Commission, Communication, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, op. cit., p. 10. 
54 Ibid., p. 4. 
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The answer to these questions is to be found first and foremost in the Mobility Partnership instrument. 
As the principal tool for operationalizing the Dialogues with the Southern Mediterranean countries, 
they provide a powerful indicator of the overall content and rationale of these new policy frameworks. 
By renewing the place of Mobility Partnerships at the heart of the re-launched GAMM, they also tell 
us much about the policy priorities underpinning the ‘renewed’ Global Approach.  
2.1 The Mobility Partnership – the tool to deliver a renewed Dialogue? 
Mobility Partnerships first gained traction at EU level in 2006, promoted as part of a Franco-German 
initiative for reducing irregular immigration by offering circular migration schemes to third countries 
in return for readmission agreements,55 They have since been presented as the key policy tool for 
integrating labour migration measures into the EU’s Global Approach to Migration. The European 
Commission has previously qualified these instruments as “the most innovative and sophisticated tool 
to date of the Global Approach to Migration”. 56 They constitute non-legally binding joint declarations 
negotiated between the Commission on behalf of interested member states and a third country. 
Member states offer a range of benefits, from visa facilitation schemes and regular channels for 
temporary migration in exchange for a commitment on the part of the signatory third country to 
cooperate with the EU in the management of irregular migration, in particular readmission, return and 
border control/surveillance policies. Mobility partnerships have been launched so far with just four 
countries: Cape Verde, Georgia, Moldova,57 and most recently Armenia.58 Efforts to conclude a 
partnership with Senegal proved unsuccessful following the reluctance of the latter to conclude 
readmission agreements with the EU.59   
Although the Mobility Partnership has been hailed as the means for the EU to move its migration 
policies away from an overriding focus on security and border control and towards opening up 
channels for mobility, practical experience with the first set of mobility partnerships has shown a 
discrepancy between rhetoric and reality.60 Current Mobility Partnerships reveal a heavy emphasis on 
border control reform as the condition for signatory states to access what amounts in reality to very 
few labour migration opportunities.61 For instance, in the case of the Moldovan Mobility Partnership, 
it was noted that the majority of the ‘mobility’ or ‘development’-related projects listed in the Annex to 
the Declaration either simply renewed measures already in progress or had very limited reach.62 It has 
been suggested that Mobility Partnerships are used as a vehicle in which to promote the EU’s highly 
                                                     
55 Carrera & Sagrera (2009). 
56 The European Commission has qualified these instruments as “the most innovative and sophisticated tool to 
date of the Global Approach to Migration”. See European Commission, “Mobility Partnerships as a Tool of the 
Global Approach to Migration”, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2009) 1240, Brussels, 18 
September 2009. 
57 See the Annex to Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the 
European Union and Georgia, 16396/09, Brussels, 20 November 2009(c); Annex to Council of the European 
Union, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Cape 
Verde, 9460/08, Brussels, 21 May 2008; Annex to Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on a 
Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the republic of Moldova, 9460/08, Brussels, 21 May 
2008. 
58 A Mobility Partnership between Armenia and ten EU Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Sweden) was signed on 27th October 2011. See 
Council Press Release, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and Armenia, 
3121st Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 27-28 October 2011. 
59 See Chou & Gibert (forthcoming). 
60 See Collett (2007). 
61 See Carrera & Sagrera (2009) and Parkes (2009). 
62 Jeandesboz (2011). 
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controversial readmission agreements with third countries.63 This view is supported by a 2008 
statement by the Commission which called for an intensification of readmission efforts by “placing the 
readmission policy more firmly within the Global Approach and its priorities and using the potential 
of mobility partnerships”.64 The mobility partnerships have thus provided a more favourable 
framework for the EU to pursue its traditional external policy agenda (readmission and countering 
irregular migration) – utilising the discourse of development, partnership and mobility promoted by 
the Global Approach, without altering its traditional policy goals. 
The Mobility Partnerships with the Southern Mediterranean countries are currently still under 
negotiation. As a “flexible instrument”, developed under a “tailor-made, country-by-country 
approach”65 one cannot predict for certain the final shape each Partnership will take. Nevertheless, 
some clues are provided by the previously mentioned Dialogue Communication, as well as the 
Communication on the GAMM.  
To begin with, it is clear that the Commission intends to pursue the offer/reward structure on which 
current Mobility Partnerships are based. The offer to the third state includes the conclusion of visa 
facilitation agreements, and potentially labour and circular migration schemes, flanked by a package 
of capacity-building measures in the areas of asylum (e.g. development of asylum legislation), 
migration and development (e.g. facilitating low-cost remittances and measures for countering brain 
drain) and measures to support the respect for fundamental rights for third country nationals in the 
partner country (further details of which are not provided). 
However, access to these ‘benefits’ will, as stipulated in the Dialogue Communication, “depend on the 
prior fulfilment of a number of conditions…”66 Among others, partner countries will be required to 
conclude readmission agreements with the EU; sign working arrangements with Frontex; cooperate in 
joint surveillance operations in the Mediterranean sea; and build capacity in other aspects of integrated 
border management – such as document security and countering the trafficking and smuggling of 
human beings.67 Translated into Mobility Partnerships, the EU’s supposedly ‘comprehensive’ or 
‘longer-term’ approach to migration policy in the region therefore begins increasingly to resemble a 
continuation of the standard ‘short-term’ security measures of the kind enacted during the height of the 
Arab Spring. Closer examination further puts into doubt the claim of a comprehensive and renewed 
policy approach to migration from North Africa via the Mobility Partnerships. In particular, we 
identify two principal deficits in the Mobility Partnerships as set out in the Dialogue Communication 
which are explored further below: first, that of limited possibilities for ‘mobility’; and second,  a 
guiding principle of conditionality that undermines the claim of a genuine and balanced ‘partnership’. 
2.1.1 Locating ‘mobility’ within the Partnership 
A long-running deficit of Mobility Partnerships is the gap between the opportunities for migration and 
labour mobility that these instruments supposedly promote, and their materialisation in practice. 
Inclusion of projects which would offer labour migration for third country nationals is entirely 
dependent on the willingness of individual member states to volunteer for such schemes.  Current pilot 
projects with Mobility Partnerships indicate little enthusiasm in this regard from participating member 
states.  
                                                     
63 Nellen-Stucky (2009). 
64 European Commission, Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: Increasing coordination, coherence 
and synergies, COM (2008) 611, Brussels, 8 October 2008. 
65 European Commission, Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern 
Mediterranean countries, op. cit., p. 10. 
66 Ibid., p. 7. 
67 Ibid., p. 11. 
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When examining the text of the Dialogue Communication, stimulating mobility does not appear to be 
the central imperative underpinning the approach and references to labour migration opportunities are 
ambiguous. To begin with, the term ‘mobility’ is preferred over that of ‘migration’, reflecting the 
general shift in official EU language (evident for instance in the renaming of the Global Approach). 
‘Mobility’ here implies temporary movement rather than more permanent forms of migration, 
reflected in the general emphasis in the Dialogue communication on short-term, temporary movement. 
Mobility of third country nationals is underlined as being of ‘strategic importance,’ so long as it 
applies to the following categories of “short term visitors, tourists, students, researchers, business 
people or visiting family members’.68  By contrast, there appears to be an explicit shift of emphasis 
away from more permanent (or semi-permanent) forms of legal migration.  
In the Dialogue communication, possibilities for labour migration are couched in highly provisional 
terms: 
“Depending on the actual possibilities and needs of the EU Member States interested in 
actively participating in the Mobility Partnerships and of their respective labour markets, and 
taking into account their right to determine the volumes of economic migrants to be admitted, 
the Mobility Partnerships could also encompass specific schemes for facilitating labour 
migration between interested member states and the Southern Mediterranean countries.” 
(emphasis added)69 
Under the umbrella of ‘schemes for facilitating labour migration’ are placed activities such as 
measures to improve skills recognition, portability of social rights, and measures for return and 
reintegration which – though welcome – do not imply concrete new channels for prospective workers 
in North Africa to access EU labour markets.  
The ultimate prize of visa liberalisation is referenced towards the end of the document, again, in highly 
provisional terms: 
In the long-term, provided that visa facilitation and readmission agreements are effectively 
implemented, gradual steps towards visa liberalisation for individual partner countries could 
be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the overall relationship with the 
partner country concerned and provided that conditions for well-managed and secure mobility 
are in place. 
The mobility offered by the Dialogue therefore, is restricted, non-permanent and highly conditional. It 
is this conditionality, a central guiding principle of the Mobility Partnership, which gives rise to the 
second main weakness of this instrument. 
2.1.2 Dialogue or monologue? An imbalanced partnership 
The extent to which ‘the Dialogue’ offers a genuine and equal partnership through the Mobility 
Partnership instrument is in doubt, at least if we understand partnership to imply an agreement 
between parties to work together in the pursuit of common goals, on the basis of mutual trust and 
cooperation. This understanding is at odds with the conditionality that underpins the structure of the 
Mobility Partnership.70 In the words of the Dialogue Communication, this conditionality: 
                                                     
68 European Commission, Communication, The Global Approach to migration and Mobility, op. cit., p. 3. 
69 European Commission, Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern 
Mediterranean countries, op. cit. 
70 ‘Conditionality’ is identified as one of the four principles governing the Mobility Partnership as presented in 
the Dialogue Communication (alongside ‘bilateralism’, ‘differentiation’ and ‘monitoring’). See European 
Commission, Communication, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean 
countries, op. cit., p. 8. 
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“will enable the EU to extend the benefits of mobility proposed in the Partnership to those 
who demonstrate their willingness and capability to make progress, especially in those areas 
that are of importance to the EU.” [emphasis added].71  
Aside from initial meetings between high-level EU officials and members of the interim authorities in 
Tunisia and Egypt, there is little indication that the Dialogue was developed in close consultation with 
the third countries it intends to target. Rather it appears to have been presented as a fait accompli to the 
authorities of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco with the expectation that those states would be ready to 
undertake the strict security requirements demanded in return for limited mobility possibilities.  
Yet the willingness of the third countries in question to sign up to the Mobility Partnerships is far from 
certain. This is particularly the case as the credibility of the incentives on offer are questionable. The 
Mobility Partnerships rely on voluntary proposals by interested member states which are articulated in 
Joint Declarations – non-legally binding policy instruments the enforcement of which cannot be 
guaranteed by the Commission.72 The high costs associated with implementing the EU’s demands, 
together with the uncertainty of the rewards, would support the contention in Cassarino & Tocci 
(2011) that the Mobility Partnerships are in many ways of greater value to the EU than to the countries 
of the Southern Mediterranean.73 This is born out in the lukewarm reception accorded to the Dialogues 
by the North African countries targeted. We have seen (in section 1) that the new authorities in Tunis 
were initially reluctant to bow to EU pressure to cooperate on the security dimensions of migration.  
This is confirmed by reports that scoping talks on the launch of the Dialogues have proved more 
complicated than the EU anticipated. Egypt has now declined the offer of a Mobility Partnership 
outright. Negotiations with Morocco have also been highly problematic, with the conclusion of a 
readmission agreement between the EU and Morocco proving a major sticking point.74 Meanwhile 
priorities laid down by Tunisia for its Mobility Partnership (including labour migration, fundamental 
rights protection for migrants, wide visa facilitation and development) reveal a divergence of interests 
that may also complicate discussions going forward.75 Faced with this less than successful progress, in 
early 2012 the EU added Jordan as a fourth country with which it envisages establishing a Mobility 
Partnership. A DG Home-led mission was subsequently despatched to Jordan to conduct exploratory 
talks and the outcome remains to be seen.76   
With the appropriateness of the Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security in question, the 
following section explores the reasons for this outcome, examining the institutional power plays 
behind the EU’s overarching policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean region. 
3. DG Home affairs diplomacy: An AFSJ foreign policy post-
Lisbon 
To better understand the why behind the nature of the EU policy responses in the wake of the Arab 
Spring and the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security, this paper argues that it is necessary to 
examine the institutional factors and agents that have shaped their preparation, content, negotiation 
and implementation. Over the past decade, the two main actors responsible for setting up the Mobility 
Partnerships, as well as steering the wider Global Approach to Migration, have been the European 
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72 Carrera & Sagrera (2009). 
73 Tocci & Cassarino (2011). 
74 Interviews with officials of the Council, Commission and EEAS; see also Fargues & Fandrich (2012). 
75 Memo presented by Ambassador Ridha Farhat in Brussels (2012), “Les Grands axes en matière d’immigration 
et d’intégration”, cited in Fargues & Fandrich (2012). 
76 Joint Commission-EEAS Press Release, “EU-Jordan Task Force – Co-chairs Conclusions”, Brussels, 22 
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Commission’s Directorate-General for Home Affairs (DG Home) and the Council’s High Level 
Working Group on Migration and Asylum (HLWG). Both have played the part of ‘political 
entrepreneurs’ in driving the formidable expansion of the external dimension of migration at European 
level.77 As Guiraudon (2003, p. 267) has appropriately signalled, the phrase “when policemen replace 
diplomats”78 describes “in a nutshell the increasing involvement of law and order personnel at the 
European level since the early 1980s and, among them, civil servants in charge of migration 
management”.79  
Interviews conducted for the purposes of this paper revealed that EU Home Affairs officials remain 
very much in the driver’s seat of the external dimensions of the EU’s migration policy agenda, with 
the EEAS appearing to be sidelined in the decision-making processes. For instance, it was the 
European Commission’s DG Home that was given lead responsibility (‘Chef de file’) in drafting the 
Dialogue Communication (as well as the Communication on the GAMM). This is a strategically 
important position: the service that prepares a draft for proposal has a huge advantage over other 
actors and usually wields the real power over the policy issue in question.80 The EEAS, despite having 
made substantive comments on the draft Dialogue communication, reportedly met with little success 
when it tried to steer the policy formulation of the dialogue via the Commission’s inter-service 
consultation mechanism into a more ‘positive’ (i.e. less security-focused, conditionality-based 
approach ) engagement with the North African countries.   
Further, the predominance of a ‘home affairs approach’ and marginalisation of the EEAS runs through 
the institutional structures that frame the development and implementation of the Dialogues. Members 
of the EEAS voiced frustration that in Council working group discussions the service could give its 
comments but remained only ‘one of the voices’ around the table.  
The primary site of negotiations in the Council on the Dialogues – and specifically on the preparation 
of the Mobility Partnerships – is the HLWG on Migration and Asylum. The origins of this working 
group are primarily rooted in Justice and Home Affairs objectives. Although the HLWG reports 
formally to the Foreign Affairs Council, its conclusions receive little attention in this forum and its de 
facto line of command is to the Justice and Home Affairs Council. Indeed, it is telling that Mobility 
Partnership Joint Declarations are signed in the margins of the Justice and Home Affairs Council and 
not the Foreign Affairs Council. Previous research has highlighted the predominance of senior 
officials from the Interior Ministries of the member states in the HLWG,81 noting that in practice, it is 
often the same interior ministry officials who attend the meetings in the Strategic Committee on 
Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) who also represent their countries in the HLWG.82 
Further, recent Council guidelines stipulate that the Chair of SCIFA should participate in the HLWG, 
“ensuring that SCIFA plays the lead role in coordination of and interplay between the internal and 
external dimensions of migration”.83 Although latterly a concerted effort has been made to re-balance 
representation in the HLWG between officials from interior and foreign ministries, nevertheless it is 
clear that the working configurations of the Council permit interior ministry officials to play a central 
role in formulating the Dialogues (see Figure 1). 
 
 
                                                     
77  See Wolff (2007, pp. 77-99). 
78 A. Turk (rapporteur), Quand les policiers succèdent aux diplomats. Rapport d’information 523 (97-8) de la 
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82 Chou, ibid., p. 551. 
83 Council doc. 17182/11, The Future of SCIFA, 18 November 2011. 
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Figure 1. JHA working structures inside the Council of the EU  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
It is not only in the internal preparation of the Dialogues, but also in the negotiations with third 
countries that DG Home Affairs has been taking a lead role. Somewhat surprisingly, it is this DG and 
not the EEAS that is leading diplomatic missions abroad to promote and discuss the content of the 
Mobility Partnerships in North Africa. Indeed, Stefano Manservisi, the Director-General of DG Home 
Affairs headed two visits in October 2011 to Tunisia and Rabat with the aim of launching the 
Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security,84 accompanied only by a junior representative from the 
EEAS. Interviews with policy-makers confirm that DG Home, and even the EU Border Agency 
Frontex,85 appear to enjoy a surprising degree of autonomy from the EEAS and Foreign Affairs 
Council when conveying their views to third states’ authorities. 
Examination of the institutional arrangements surrounding the elaboration of the Dialogue for 
Migration, Mobility and Security for the Southern Mediterranean reveals therefore that, despite the 
creation of the EEAS, this body is far from steering the agenda on the external dimension of 
migration. This outcome has a very real impact on the policy process. 
EU home affairs and national level interior ministry officials tend to have different substantive 
interpretations, points of reference and priorities when formulating policy compared to diplomats and 
foreign ministry actors. On one side, foreign ministry actors tend to approach questions related to 
human mobility within an integrated approach to wider social, economic and environmental policy 
challenges, one that is informed by the wider negotiation agenda they undertake with third states and 
the deeper understanding gained of the political interests and issues of interest of the partner country. 
                                                     
84 See the Tunisia News Agency report, “Tunisia – EU: Making Visa Getting for Europe Easier (Manservisi)”, 6 
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Within the perspective of the EU neighbourhood, this policy approach may be labelled ‘inclusive’ – 
rooted in a strategy that envisages closer integration with the countries of the EU neighbourhood so as 
to share the benefits of the internal market and four freedoms (including free circulation). By contrast, 
national ministry of interior officials are characterised by a more ‘exclusive’ outlook and internally-
framed interest, primarily concerned with the need to reinforce the external borders of the Union, 
‘police’ migration and consolidate the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for the benefit of EU 
citizens.86  
Indeed, DG Home’s outlook on migration from the Southern Mediterranean during the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring was summarised by one EU official as “thinking from Lampedusa”, perceiving migration 
through a narrow lens: namely its expected short-term effect on the EU member states. Combined with 
a policy framing of migration that is increasingly dominated by security concerns, in which migrants 
and asylum-seekers are inherently depicted as a threat,87 the result is a restrictive stance on human 
mobility, in which the overriding concern is to stem irregular immigration. Therefore, when DG Home 
goes abroad, it does so without taking into account the broader sectoral issues at stake in the EU’s 
wider negotiations with third countries.  
By contrast, a ‘foreign ministry’ outlook of the EEAS would be expected to better allow for a more 
‘global’ understanding and ‘balancing of issues and interests’ relevant for relations with North African 
countries (of which only one includes human mobility). Within the overall framework of the ENP and 
its bilateral Action Plans drawn up between the EU and third countries, migration issues are situated 
within the context of a wide range of priorities and measures designed to promote economic growth, 
employment and social cohesion, reduce poverty, and protect the environment.88 Ideally, the 
migration-related policies and initiatives pursued by DG Home should aim to exploit synergies within 
this wider range of objectives.  
However, reports from EEAS officials indicate that migration management activities in third countries 
can often clash with wider foreign policy goals. For instance, return and reintegration actions have 
been found to be in tension with development goals in certain African countries; another example is 
the insertion of readmission clauses in Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) which have 
reportedly made negotiations with third countries a “nightmare”.89 The concern is that the home 
affairs-centred Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security divert attention from the process of 
wider economic and political reform and obstruct constructive relations between the EU and Southern 
Mediterranean states. Indeed, the two policy processes (based on a foreign affairs approach within the 
Partnership for Demcoracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean and the home 
affairs approach under the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security) could even stand in 
contradiction of one another if the Dialogues encourage third states to enact migration and border 
control-oriented policies that endanger human rights.  
Fargues & Fandrich (2012) have also observed the tension between the EU’s ‘more for more’ 
approach under the renewed ENP, which focuses funding on democracy promotion and ‘common 
values’, and the EU’s activities under the GAM. For instance, the EU states in its Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity that this framework “needs to support wholeheartedly the wish of 
the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as our right” and that it 
should be “rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values” including democracy, 
                                                     
86 S. Wolff (2007). 
87 Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, The State of Internal Security in the EU, joint report to the Standing 
Committee on operational cooperation on internal security (COSI), p. 2. 
88 The ENP Action Plan is a bilaterally agreed contractual working agenda concluded for a three year period 
between each ENP partner country and the EU covering political, economic, social, trade and market related 
issues. 
89 Interview with officials of the EEAS. 
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human rights, good governance and rule of law.90  Thus any parallel policy agenda that seeks to 
engage undemocratic third states in readmission agreements and to fund capacity-building in border 
controls and asylum will have to pay careful attention to the human rights impact of its activities, their 
compliance with rule of law standards and their democratic accountability. To ignore the potential 
contradictions between these external policies risks not only undermining the very principles that 
underpin the ENP, but also the basis for cooperation with third countries as laid down in the Lisbon 
Treaty (Art. 8 TEU), which requires cooperative relations with the neighbourhood to be “founded on 
the values of the Union”, including the respect of fundamental rights. 
What are the reasons for the continuing dominance of a home affairs approach within the post-Lisbon 
institutional set-up of the EU’s external action on migration policy cooperation? We distinguish 
between three factors: i) questions of competence and competition, ii) the internal dynamics of DG 
Home Affairs and iii) the role of ‘venue shopping’ in shaping the external dimension of migration. 
3.1 Competence and competition  
Ultimate responsibility for the external dimension of migration remains with DG Home in so far as the 
EEAS’ responsibility and mandate in this domain has not been properly spelled out. This is a 
challenge facing the functioning of EEAS more generally. From the outset it was clear that the 
creation of the EEAS, and the complexity of its tasks, would entail a number of portfolio overlaps 
between the EEAS and the European Commission. Despite the need for an effective modus operandi, 
none has been developed, leaving room for tension (see Dimulescu, 2011). The provisions on the 
EEAS in the Lisbon Treaty are minimal, and state rather ambiguously in Art. 21 (3) TEU that the 
EEAS should comprise officials from relevant departments of the General-Secretariat of the Council 
and the Commission. By not specifying which are the ‘relevant departments’, this has paved the way 
for a multitude of turf sensitivities between the Commission and EEAS (see Duke, 2008). A 
confidential report prepared by HR Ashton in December 2011 on the first year of operations of the 
EEAS acknowledged problems in the division of roles between the EEAS and the Commission. The 
report was accompanied by reports of ‘hostile’ and obstructive behaviour on the part of the 
Commission and relations between the two institutions resembling “internecine warfare”.91 
The most contentious of these turf battles occurred during early negotiations on the design of the 
EEAS over development policy, with one camp arguing that aid is so intimately linked to foreign 
policy that it should be fully embedded within the structures of the EEAS, and the second arguing that 
development cooperation should be kept separate from foreign policy objectives (see Drieskens &Van 
Schaik, 2010, p. 13). The rivalry between the EEAS and the Commission was especially intense 
because at stake was control over the EU’s substantial aid budget. After intervention by President 
Barroso, it was decided that development policy, management and implementation would remain in 
the hands of the new Commission DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, while the EEAS 
was given responsibility for setting strategic priorities for development policy. 
This example serves to demonstrate the Commission’s reluctance to relinquish control over strategic 
policy portfolios to the EEAS. It also reminds us that the position of DG Home Affairs is not 
exceptional – there are other policy fields with strong external impacts that have not been transferred 
to the EEAS.92 What makes the isolation of DG Home from the EU’s broader external relations more 
                                                     
90 European Commission, High Representative, Joint Communication on A Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Brussels, 8 March 2011, COM(2011) 200 final. 
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precarious, however, is that it seems to have been ‘forgotten’ as a DG dealing with external issues, as 
demonstrated by a recently instituted coordination mechanism between those Commissioners dealing 
with external policies, chaired by HR Ashton. This grouping involves Commissioner Piebalgs 
(development), Füle (enlargement, ENP), Gorgieva (humanitarian aid, crisis response), De Gucht 
(trade) and Rehn (economic and monetary affairs), but not Home Affairs Commissioner Ms 
Malmström.93Although this structure is not strategically central, it signals nonetheless that DG Home 
is not naturally thought of as an external actor.  
3.2 DG Home Affairs’ expansion via foreign policy 
A second institutional factor relates to the internal dynamics of DG Home, which have favoured an 
expansion of activities towards the JHA external dimension to the exclusion or sidelining of other 
Commission services. Here DG Home Affairs’ efforts to expand its influence are not particularly 
unusual – it is common practice for DGs and their sub-units to protect their area of activity and try 
broaden the scope of their responsibilities in new directions, competing as they are for budgets, scarce 
resources and status. In the case of DG Home Affairs, however, an added driver has been the difficulty 
this DG has encountered in moving Europeanization forward on immigration policies. Coming up 
against the obstacles of national sovereignty and interests by national officials, efforts to establish an 
AFSJ have seen protracted negotiations inside the Council and substantial watering down – if not 
blocking – of proposals resulting in minimal harmonisation.94  
By contrast, ‘the external dimension’ has offered new avenues or ‘policy venues’ for DG Home to 
advance its migration agenda and policy interests, via a route that does not threaten to directly 
encroach on national immigration and asylum systems and does not come up against the constraints of 
national bureaucracies.95 Thus where DG Home Affairs has come up against internal blockades, it has 
shifted its policy cooperation to the external dimension, through cooperation and relations with third 
countries. As member states have shown increasing resistance to European-level attempts to 
harmonize elements of immigration policies, DG Home may well have viewed ‘going abroad’ as a 
means of extending its powers, discretion and competences.  
As a measure of its success, this DG has seen its institutional stake in ‘the external dimension’ of 
migration increase dramatically. A small Task Force on external aspects situated in the former DG 
Justice, Freedom and Security has progressively evolved into a large Unit for International Affairs in 
DG Home Affairs. As DG Home Affairs expanded its competences in the external dimension of 
migration, it simultaneously limited the influence of other Commission services, such as the former 
DG for External Relations (DG Relex – now replaced by the EEAS), in key communications on the 
external dimension of migration.96 Today, for the DG to cede full or partial responsibility on the 
Global Approach to another institutional actor like the EEAS would be to strip this Commission 
service of a core competence; hence, protecting and consolidating this area of responsibility becomes a 
key strategic objective.  
A recent example is DG Home’s efforts to increase its leverage over ‘the external dimensions’ by 
extending its mandate for Home Affairs funding in third countries. Currently the main EU funding 
instrument managed by DG Home is the General Programme on Solidarity and Management of 
Migration Flows (SOLID), which only allows for small-scale funding of activities in third countries.97 
The external dimension of home affairs policies is currently supported primarily through geographical 
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Section 11.2. Groups of Commissioners, 16 April 2010 (SEC(2010)475). 
94 See Wiesbrock (2010). 
95 For an extended discussion of this phenomenon, see Lavenex (2006). 
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20 | CARRERA, DEN HERTOG & PARKIN 
 
and thematic external instruments which are programmed and managed by the Directorates-Generals 
for Enlargement and Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, including the Thematic Programme 
on Cooperation with Third Countries in the Area of Migration and Asylum under the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which is the main instrument for providing assistance to third countries 
in the context of the Global Approach.98 However, DG Home Affairs has expressed its dissatisfaction 
with the status quo. In a background document to the 2011 public consultation on EU Home Affairs 
funding, it contended that: 
These instruments are designed to mainly cater for other policy objectives (enlargement, 
development, neighbourhood policy) and not to support primarily the external dimension of 
home affairs policies. Moreover, as a rule EU funding essentially qualifies as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and must therefore by definition target the needs and 
priorities of the beneficiary countries, not the interests of donors. However, there is a clear 
need to increase the EU's leverage in order to allow it to achieve its own policy priorities and 
to cater for the EU's interests, such as security and migration management, even when these 
are not a priority for the partner countries.99 
The wording of this document demonstrates in stark terms the diverging policy priorities of Home 
Affairs and Foreign Affairs. Despite the rhetoric of the Global Approach which operationalises the 
‘migration-development nexus’, DG Home Affairs puts a separation between funding for development 
purposes which meets the needs of beneficiary countries, and funding that supports home affairs’ 
objectives and serves EU interests of security and migration control. Thus it goes on to cite as a 
“drawback” of the Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum that “it faces growing pressure to 
emphasise its development component to the detriment of the more security-related aspects of the 
migration phenomena.” In response to these perceived deficiencies, EU Home Affairs Commissioner 
Malmstrom has pushed for substantial funding to home affairs-related activities in third countries in 
advance of the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The current Commission proposal on the new 
EU budget post-2013 stipulates that the new Home Affairs funds (a Migration and Asylum Fund and 
an Internal Security Fund): 
should have a sizeable external dimension in order to ensure that the EU has the means to 
pursue its home affairs policy priorities in relations with third countries.... in relation to 
resettlement of refugees, readmission agreements, regional protection programmes, the fight 
against irregular migration, reinforcing border management and police cooperation with e.g. 
neighbouring countries.100 
The European Parliament has expressed concern that this increased funding could lead to a 
redeployment of funds away from budget lines for development cooperation.101 Nevertheless, if 
passed, the new funding arrangements would substantially increase DG Home Affair’s clout under the 
Global Approach by providing the incentives the EU currently lacks to persuade countries of the 
Southern Mediterranean to cooperate on migration management.  
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3.3 The ‘External dimensions’ of EU migration policy as ‘venue 
shopping’ 
A third factor takes into account the interests driving national level policymakers. Guiraudon has 
shown how the EU provides a supranational venue where national actors cooperate on policy in order 
to gain ‘autonomy’ from constraints that would otherwise impede their actions at the domestic level 
(see Guiraudon, 2000 and 2003). Member state representatives do not only use the EU level to project 
their national interests, but political actors may also take the ‘Brussels route’ where they are less 
encumbered than in national settings by other institutions, governmental ministries and the judiciary, 
which can act as veto points to policy initiatives.  
For example, in most member states, the national interior ministries cannot autonomously conduct and 
implement policy on ‘the external dimensions’ – whether that be visas, readmission, security and 
policing in third countries or technical and financial capacity-building for migration management. 
Their actions in these domains would require checks and validation by foreign and international 
development ministries, seriously constraining their leeway. However, as the EU institutional set-up 
does not yet have a strong ‘foreign ministry’ actor, with the EEAS still at an early stage in its 
development, these restraints are almost absent. Lavenex (2006, p. 330) has gone so far to argue that: 
The search for policy solutions beyond the territory of the EU is motivated less by the search 
for innovative solutions than by the interest of justice and home affairs officials to increase 
their autonomy vis-à-vis other actors in the domestic and European policy arenas.  
This search for autonomy and discretionary power has resulted in the highly fragmented character of 
the Global Approach as different institutional actors and member states have pursued separate policies 
and engaged in various disjointed initiatives on the external dimension of migration.102  Initiatives 
under the GAMM are highly piecemeal and there appears to have been little effort made to streamline 
the scattered, obscure and inconsistent policy frameworks in which current ‘dialogues’ with third 
countries are set.103  The challenges to accountability are therefore substantial. First, because such lack 
of knowledge on the part of the EU of what precisely it is doing abroad prevents a basic evaluation 
and scrutiny of the EU’s actions in the domain of the AFSJ in third countries. And second, because 
much of the decision-making on the external dimensions has been – and continues to be under the 
Lisbon Treaty – a highly inter-governmental process, driven by member states within the Council, 
often to the exclusion of European Parliament oversight (as in the case of Mobility Partnerships). 
In a similar fashion, EU Home Affairs agencies, such as Frontex and Europol, have become 
increasingly active in the external dimension of migration policy, thereby also gaining autonomy from 
domestic and European accountability and central foreign policy coordination constraints (see Guild et 
al., 2011). Frontex is the prime example of this development; the Agency now plays an important role 
in central EU border and migration initiatives such as the Mobility Partnerships (where third countries 
are obliged to sign working arrangements with Frontex) and in the setting up and future operation of 
the “European border surveillance system” (EUROSUR).104 The agency has already concluded 17 
working arrangements with third states, with several more currently under negotiation.105 Moreover, 
during the Frontex joint operations HERA I and HERA II of 2006, it cooperated with the Senegalese 
and Mauritanian authorities in joint surveillance exercises beyond EU borders.106 The amended 
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Frontex Regulation (October 2011) further consolidates the external relations role of the agency. It can 
now launch and finance assistance programmes in third states and place liaison officers there, as well 
as receive third-state officers and observers within the Frontex structures.107  
These activities and competences combined show that the agency bears the potential to be an all-round 
external relations actor: it can steer policy formulation, conduct traditional foreign policy (external 
representation and international agreements) and implement policy on foreign soil. This push by 
Frontex can be seen as a way for member state home affairs officials to gain autonomy from the 
(constitutional) constraints connected to external relations at the domestic level. For example, the 
working arrangements with third states are not disclosed and are hence not subjected to any form of 
public accountability. As a matter of fact, democratic scrutiny is evaded altogether here, also on the 
European level; the European Parliament is not involved in any way when working arrangements are 
concluded. It is hence not only a push away from national constraints, but the rationale for setting up 
such agencies – namely to create autonomous expert entities – also offers European policy-makers an 
opportunity to work in an EU setting of limited accountability.108 Furthermore, the lack of 
coordination by a central foreign ministry is aggravated in the case of EU agencies’ external relations, 
as they are in an ‘orbit’ around the Community method with loose strings to the ‘core’ where the 
EEAS and the Commission are located.109 The agencies thereby also gain a more independent voice 
vis-à-vis third states. The evident danger is that this independent voice for Frontex further exacerbates 
the potential for incoherencies with the central EU external relations objectives and outputs towards 
third countries.  
4. Conclusions, scenarios and policy recommendations 
The events of the Arab spring have offered the EU a unique opportunity to assess and renew its policy 
strategies towards the Southern Mediterranean, to make a break with the policy approaches of the past 
and re-shape its policies to better support sustainable development on its Southern shore. This 
opportunity has been reinforced by the new institutional and legal setting provided by the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. Meanwhile the re-launched ENP and Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility have renewed strategic frameworks addressing the Southern Mediterranean. Yet, the 
realisation of these policy goals rests on the EU institutional configurations driving the policy agenda 
on the external dimensions of migration and the balance of power between institutional actors within 
the Global Approach. 
The result of this study depicts the complex picture of an EU institutional setting riddled with 
struggles for autonomy and authority to control the policy and funding agenda within the Global 
Approach. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the disappearance of the JHA Pillar Structure and 
the creation of an EEAS has not halted the trend of an ever-expanding Home Affairs diplomacy, 
propounded by the Commission’s DG Home, certain EU agencies and the working structures of the 
Council, which continue to dominate policy formulation on the external dimensions of EU migration 
policies. On the contrary, it appears to have been reinforced  
Rather than resolving and streamlining cumbersome EU decision-making procedures and pillar 
structure politics, the turf wars or ideological conflicts between institutions have intensified post-
Lisbon. Despite the ‘turf battles’ being fought where migration policy intersects with EU external 
affairs, the Commission’s DG Home Affairs remains very much in the driver’s seat of the EU’s policy 
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approach to the external dimension of migration. Indeed the predominance of home affairs actors and 
interior ministry officials continues to have a profound effect on the policy priorities and objectives 
framing the Global Approach, constituting the main driving factor justifying the control-oriented 
(in)security approach in the EU policy responses towards human mobility in the Mediterranean.  
This was evident in the EU’s immediate ‘emergency’ responses to the increased mobility in North 
Africa sparked by instability and war in the first half of 2011. The series of EU measures to step up 
border surveillance and to contain migrants and refugees in North Africa signalled a ‘business as 
usual’ approach that stood in sharp contrast with public declarations of solidarity and support for the 
peoples of the Southern Mediterranean. 
Despite claims of a ‘medium-longer term’ and more ‘comprehensive’ strategy for addressing 
migration and mobility from this region, the strong incentive-based conditionality regime embodied by 
the Mobility Partnerships at the heart of the Dialogues and the renewed GAMM undermines the claim 
of a renewed approach to migration policy from the Southern Mediterranean. Of course, it is too early 
to comprehensively predict the impact of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security and the 
renewed Global Approach. To a great extent the devil will be in the detail as these frameworks are 
translated from paper into practice. However, as this study has shown, early signals concerning 
prospects for the EU’s external migration policy agenda to impact positively on the Southern 
Mediterranean are not encouraging.  
The package presented in the Dialogue struggles to fulfil its promise either of opening channels for 
‘mobility’, nor of offering a genuine ‘partnership’ and throws doubt on the appropriateness of the 
Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security to deliver the EU’s ambitious political goals voiced in 
the midst of the Arab Spring. Rather the Dialogues point to a continuation of the status quo: the 
insecuritisation of movement, the proliferation of policies that endanger the human rights of migrants 
and weak and imbalanced partnerships between the EU and its neighbours in the Southern 
Mediterranean. Furthermore, DG Home’s near monopoly on the external dimension and its disregard 
for EEAS input erects obstacles to reaching an EU migration policy response to the developments in 
the Southern Mediterranean that is consistent with the EU’s wider foreign policy objectives under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy.  
The potential for the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security to facilitate economic and 
political transition of the Southern Mediterranean will in large part depend on the EU institutional 
configurations driving their design and implementation in the years ahead and the extent to which the 
imbalance in the EU power relations framing their development is addressed. We envisage two, broad-
brush scenarios over a 2030 perspective for the future direction of the EU’s migration policy agenda 
towards the Southern Mediterranean region, and particularly the North Africa states of Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The first consists of a ‘business as usual’ scenario with the likelihood of 
negotiations on Mobility Partnerships coming to a standstill and a clear risk to the effectiveness of the 
EU’s response. The second envisages a re-orientation of the EU’s long-term vision on human mobility 
with increased opportunities for a genuine cross-Mediterranean partnership. 
4.1 Scenarios 
4.1.1 A Home Affairs-centred dialogue 
The first scenario envisages the continued semi-monopoly of DG Home on the Dialogues for 
Mobility, Migration and Security, accompanied by increasing competition between DG Home and 
other EU actors.  
Under this scenario, the potential to deliver credible Mobility Partnerships with Southern 
Mediterranean states is slim. It envisages an EU incapable, and member states unwilling, to offer 
improved legal channels for economic migration beyond a narrow category of individuals, particularly 
in an economic climate of low growth and high unemployment. On the North African side, the 
readmission agreement would be highly problematic to accept in light of lacking real and credible 
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upfront incentives by the EU and (in particular) the member states. Without credible channels for 
labour migration, this scenario diminishes the prospect for ‘mobility’ to support development in North 
African countries via remittances, skilling and brain circulation.  
At the same time, increased control over funding programmes for the external dimension of migration 
and asylum by DG Home would see strengthening support for activities in pursuit of EU internal 
security and migration management objectives. Financial and technical support is channelled to 
governmental police, border and asylum authorities with the primary objectives of containing 
migration towards the EU territory, rather than addressing the deeper socio-economic and governance 
causes of migration. In parallel, increased cooperation between EU JHA agencies such as Frontex, 
Europol and EASO and their equivalents in third states reinforce the problems of fragmentation, low 
visibility and low accountability that currently characterises the Global Approach. 
Ultimately, this is likely to reinforce inconsistencies in EU policies towards North African states and 
result in decreased leverage for the EU. North African regimes, presented with an inconsistent policy 
agenda, may choose to appease the Union by fulfilling ‘security’ measures aimed at preventing 
irregular migration while creating leeway to slacken efforts towards the overall goals relating to 
democracy, stronger civil society and human rights protection. 
In sum, the continuing dominance of the home affairs approach sees the GAMM remain trapped in the 
logic of security, short-termism, insularity and bi-lateralism. Accordingly, in the long run this would 
contribute to a business as usual scenario in the Southern Mediterranean where political reform and 
human rights are sidelined while issues such as combating terrorism and containing migration 
continue to dominate the policy agenda. The EU’s failure to deliver substantive commitments through 
the Global Approach results in a failure to establish strong and mutually cooperative partnerships with 
the new regimes in the Arab world, contributing to a slide towards increasing polarisation of the two 
regions. According to the MEDPRO project’s reference scenarios, this would accord with the red 
transition to – ‘The Euro-Mediterranean area under threat’ and of a widening gap and increasing 
tensions and conflicts between the two shores of the Mediterranean.110 
4.1.2 A Re-oriented Dialogue 
The second scenario is one in which the EU manages to conclude re-oriented Mobility Partnerships 
across the Mediterranean. The ‘Home Affairs focus’ is replaced with a balanced, fully accountable 
framework that roots human mobility modalities into a wider agenda that complements social and 
economic development in the region. On the level of political discourse, the insecuritisation of human 
mobility and restrictive (control-oriented) policies are ceased. In such an environment, the member 
states are able to offer real and credible incentives for labour migration and visa facilitation allowing 
the Mobility Partnership to evolve into a powerful tool for EU external relations. 
Firstly, in this scenario the EEAS fulfils the ‘foreign ministry’ role at the EU level. The EEAS would 
be mandated to coordinate the elaboration and identification of strategic priorities for the EU’s 
dialogues, and to lead dialogues abroad, drawing on the input of all relevant actors. Putting the EEAS 
in the lead of this policy agenda ensures that migration policy aspects become truly embedded in the 
EU’s external relations towards the North African countries. Care is taken to avoid a scenario in which 
competences (planning and management functions) on the external dimension of migration are simply 
transferred to the EEAS, and with them home affairs security objectives which could exacerbate 
creeping contamination of EU foreign affairs and development policy with traditional JHA priorities. 
Clear and distinct boundaries between those areas that fall under the mandate of the EEAS and those 
falling under the responsibility of DG Home are identified and the EEAS as overall coordinator of the 
GAMM would ensure that the Dialogue is informed and shaped by the expertise of a wide range of 
Commission Directorates-General, such as DG Development, DG Employment as well as DG Home. 
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It would thus meaningfully enhance horizontal policy cooperation on the EU level while maintaining 
the competition and ‘checks and balances’ which are necessary for a healthy policy process. 
Ultimately, this could help towards establishing a more convincing ‘EU voice’ abroad and increased 
leverage for the overarching EU policy objectives vis-à-vis the North African states.  
Secondly, this involvement of a wider scope of actors would increase the prospect of the EU engaging 
the North African states in reoriented mobility partnerships. As flexible instruments, mobility 
partnerships hold the potential to develop into more balanced frameworks of cooperation. Here, 
mobility partnerships are legally binding international agreements, injecting the legal certainty, 
democratic accountability and judicial scrutiny over their compliance with rule of law and human 
rights standards that is currently lacking (see Carrera, 2011, pp. 19-20). In this scenario, the EU gives 
real and credible incentives for labour migration, including packages of measures to support and 
improve  migrants’ rights, features that will take on increasing importance as the EU competes with 
other regions of the world for labour, skills and talent. The EU diversifies its ‘demands’ from irregular 
migration aspects to overall reforms needed to fulfil the promised ‘Partnership for democracy and 
shared prosperity’. Moreover, the conditionality approach does not feature in this scenario. Here, the 
envisaged cross-Mediterranean cooperation is a genuine dialogue. The expected result is an increased 
willingness of the part of the North African countries to conclude an overall agreement with the EU 
and, in the longer run, movement towards the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean zone of 
increasingly liberalised movement of individuals between the EU and North Africa. 
4.2 Policy Recommendations 
In view of the advantages of Scenario 2, the following recommendations are proposed to contribute to 
a re-framing of the Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security:  
1. The role of the EEAS in the domain of the external dimension of migration should be 
strengthened by increasing the service’s institutional capacities in this portfolio and revisiting 
the division of responsibilities between the EEAS and Commission DGs such as DG Home and 
DG Devco. For instance, in the case of funding instruments, this may involve a wider 
interpretation of ‘strategic planning’ as performed by the EEAS and a narrower understanding 
of funding ‘management’ as performed by the Commission. Communications concerning the 
external dimensions of migration should always be jointly issued by the Commission (DG 
Home) and the High Representative (EEAS), accompanied by an EEAS-chaired inter-service 
consultation mechanism. In the negotiation phase, the EEAS should act as the prime interlocutor 
for the dialogue vis-à-vis the North African states. Respective responsibilities, once reassigned, 
should be clarified and laid down in a detailed set of internal guidelines. 
2. Modifications to the Council working structures could be made to reflect the expanded remit of 
the Mobility Partnership and its potentially stronger role in the ENP.  It might be examined to 
what extent the Council’s High Level Working Group on Immigration and Asylum provides the 
appropriate forum for decision-making on this tool, how to accord the EEAS a stronger role in 
discussions and how to ensure increased engagement by the Foreign Affairs Council (for 
instance, by having Mobility Partnership agreements signed in the margins of the Foreign 
Affairs Council).  
3. The Dialogues should be re-focused on the central aim of opening and supporting channels for 
legal migration, including labour migration. Given that admission of third country national 
workers is currently highly restricted by national laws, consideration should be given to 
allocating the EU greater capacity in this domain. The potential window opened by the 
recognition of EU competence to legislate on ‘the internal dimension’ of labour immigration 
policy in Art. 79.4 TFEU could be explored as a means for the EU to engage (on grounds of 
implied external competence) more actively in the domain of labour immigration with third 
countries.  This should be flanked with concrete arrangements within Mobility Partnerships to 
facilitate mobility, including the recognition of qualifications of immigrant workers, guarantees 
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for the portability of social security rights and schemes to encourage training and educational 
exchanges. 
4. In order to ensure legal certainty, policy coherence and the necessary democratic accountability 
and judicial control of Mobility Partnerships, the EU should make use of international 
agreements (similar to those used in the context of readmission and asylum cooperation) in 
place of Joint Declarations as the framework for cooperation and dialogue with third countries. 
This should better ensure compliance of the Mobility Partnership instrument with rule of law 
and fundamental rights principles. Mobility Partnerships should also be subject to regular, 
independent evaluations of their value added and overall impacts, both on their capacity to 
widen external migration policies beyond security aspects and towards agreements and 
initiatives on labour migration schemes, and on the impact on the fundamental rights of 
individual migrants.  
5. To arrive at the conclusion of a Mobility Partnership, the EU and the North African states 
should agree on a ‘Roadmap to Mobility’ which would sequence the steps needed from both 
sides. To ensure an equal partner dialogue, this cannot be a rigid conditionality approach, but 
rather a way to build mutual trust by offering specific incentives on both sides. The EU should 
streamline the dialogue into the overall approach to the North African countries, as worded in 
the Joint Communication “Partnership for democracy and shared prosperity”. Most importantly, 
mobility should not be ‘exchanged’ for measures stemming irregular migration flows, but 
should be used rather to encourage reforms needed for safeguarding human rights, building 
independent courts and narrowing socio-economic differences. In return, the Dialogue should 
also include obligations and measures to improve compliance with human rights standards in 
the EU, including in EU migration and border policies. This would ensure that there is a 
consistent line on human rights protection within the framework of mutually reinforcing 
negotiations. 
6. The transparency and accountability of EU action in the external dimensions of migration 
should be strengthened. The increased role for the EEAS as proposed here should not lead to 
more intergovernmental decision-making with the accompanying challenges to accountability. 
Translating Mobility Partnerships into international agreements would already be an important 
step towards democratic accountability as agreements would be subject to scrutiny by the 
European Parliament. But more widely, the activities of the various institutional actors engaged 
in devising and implementing actions under the GAMM, especially those of Home Affairs 
agencies such as Frontex, Europol and EASO, should be subject to greater scrutiny, both 
judicial and democratic. To that end, the working arrangements concluded with third states by 
the Home Affairs agencies should be publicly accessible and reviewed by the European 
Parliament. Only if strictly necessary, the European Parliament could have the possibility to set 
up ‘confidential working groups’ assessing the secret/non-publicly disclosed operating plans, 
risks analyses, threat assessments and working arrangements with third countries and other 
actors constituting the basis of their operations in order to examine their proportionality 
(including from a budgetary point of view), soundness and added value. The European 
Parliament should also have a binding say in the appointment of key officials in the Home 
Affairs agencies and time limits should be imposed on the confidentiality and non-disclosure of 
documents, reports and arrangements of the external relations actors, including Home Affairs 
agencies.  
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